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 Non-technical summary 
Founders often have big problems with firm financing issues. Financing problems 
may arise for many reasons. Information asymmetry and uncertainty are important, but 
so are such things as ignorance. Experienced entrepreneurs should have more knowl-
edge about financing issues and should be more likely to know who to turn to for help 
and advice. Thus, they have advantages over novice entrepreneurs when it comes to 
financing, which should be reflected in differences regarding financing issues. Addi-
tionally, the analysis accounts for the kind of experience the entrepreneurs have. It is 
important whether entrepreneurs have previously been successful or failed, because 
business failure may trigger other effects than success. 
The analysis is based on data from the KfW Start-up Monitor. The KfW Start-up 
Monitor is a representative annual survey of the German population over 14 years of 
age. The relevant survey was conducted from August to November 2003, collecting 
information on 40,155 individuals. 1,125 individuals answered in the affirmative when 
asked if they had become self-employed during the last twelve months, regardless of 
whether it be on a regular or “sideline” basis. The analysis compares novice and ex-
perienced entrepreneurs, where entrepreneurial experience means that they are either 
portfolio entrepreneurs, i.e. still participating in their previous firm, or are restarters, 
i.e. they abandoned a previous business. 
With regard to the extent of the demand for financing, there is only an indication of 
reduced demand in the case of restarters venturing after a business failure, i.e. bank-
ruptcy. However, experience has some effect on the probability of utilizing different 
financing sources and the relative extent to which each is used. Portfolio-entrepreneurs 
are more likely to use means from family and friends and do so for a greater share of 
their financing needs, too. Moreover, they use their own funds as often as other entre-
preneurs, but these make up a smaller share of the total amount financed. Restarters 
who sold or transferred a previous business are more likely to use bank loans and they 
also use them for a higher share of their total financing needs. Restarters who 
closed/liquidated a previous business utilize means from family and friends more often 
than others, yet they do not differ in the share used. 
Restarters with failure experience do not differ in their utilization of financing 
sources, either in terms of probability or extent. Nevertheless, they are more likely to 
be faced with financing difficulties. This indicates that failure experience puts pressure 
on the entrepreneurs concerned, who then have to make more effort to raise capital. 
But if they get over the hurdle they show a similar financing pattern to other entrepre-
neurs. 
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Abstract: Entrepreneurs are often faced with prob-
lems regarding start-up financing. But compared to nov-
ice entrepreneurs, experienced entrepreneurs should 
have both more knowledge and better contacts, which 
should potentially reduce the occurrence of problems 
and affect finance composition. However, experience of 
business failure might result in additional effects. This 
analysis therefore investigates the effects of experience 
on several aspects of start-up financing. It is based on 
data from the KfW Start-up Monitor, a representative 
annual survey of the German population. The results 
show that experience affects several financing issues. 
Yet the impacts depend on the kind of experience. With 
regard to previously failed entrepreneurs, who are of par-
ticular interest, the findings indicate that they cut back 
their financing demand and are more likely faced with 
problems satisfying this demand. However, previously 
failed entrepreneurs do not significantly differ in the 
sources they use to finance their businesses. 
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Motivation of the analysis 
Developed economies often actively pursue support policies that target small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Such measures aim to alleviate or correct misalloca-
tion arising through imperfect financial markets (Scholtens 1999; Walker 1989; 
Winker 1999). Typical reasons for market failure in the financial market are informa-
tion asymmetry and uncertainty, particularly concerning new and young firms. These 
enterprises lack the track record needed to build confidence. 
Analysis based on data from the KfW Start-up Monitor shows that 37 percent of 
nascent entrepreneurs consider problems in capital acquisition as severe, i.e. appraise 
the importance of this item as being at least as strong (Engel et al. 2004 or Lehnert and 
Reents 2004). As such, it is fair to say that financing is an essential problem that has to 
be solved prior to start-up. Accordingly, the denial of requests for financing is one of 
the most important reasons why nascent entrepreneurs abandon potential ventures: 20 
percent of them mention this as a reason for aborting (Engel et al. 2004).  
Financing problems may arise for many reasons. Information asymmetry and uncer-
tainty are important, but so are such things as unexpected administrative demands and 
costs, ignorance of financing options such as support programs or ignorance about 
contact persons.1 Experienced entrepreneurs should have more knowledge about these 
things and should be more likely to know who to turn to for help and advice. Thus, 
they have advantages over novice entrepreneurs when it comes to financing, which 
should be reflected in differences regarding financing issues.  
However, the analysis needs to account for the kind of experience the entrepreneurs 
have. That is, it is important whether entrepreneurs have previously been successful or 
failed. This is because business failure may trigger a reduction of the availability of 
financial means, e.g. by the worsening the entrepreneur’s creditworthiness or reducing 
others’ confidence in him or her. The hypotheses focused on in this article are based on 
these considerations. The effect of entrepreneurial experience on the occurrence of 
financing problems is analyzed, as is its impact on the utilization of different sources 
of financing. 
Derivation of hypotheses 
From the theoretical point of view, the question of how to choose sources of financ-
ing is quite clear. A theoretical model by De Meza and Southey (1996) suggests that 
entrepreneurs first try to use their own funds, informal capital and secured loans to 
capitalize their firms. Only if these means are not available any more will they fall 
back on unsecured loans, which are more costly. Own funds and informal capital are 
indeed the most important sources of funding for start-up entrepreneurs (Berger and 
Udell 1998; Scholtens 1999; Walker 1989). The rationale for this can be found at the 
capital market (Myers and Majluf 1984). Real capital markets are imperfect due to 
information asymmetries. The correction of asymmetries causes costs which vary de-
pendent on the type of financing. The result of this is the existence of “pecking orders” 
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for financing alternatives, with internal financing preferred to external financing, for 
example. In the case of young firms in particular, the information asymmetries are 
considerable. Thus, they would choose financing options that do not necessitate correc-
tion (such as their own funds) or where the correction costs are low (as in the case of 
informal capital, e.g. provided by family and friends). 
Therefore if entrepreneurs do not use bank loans, it may be due to their preferences 
not to use this finance source. However, not using such capital might also be traced 
back to restrictions in capital supply caused by information asymmetries (Stiglitz and 
Weiss 1981). Evidence for this phenomenon can be found in the form of refused loan 
applications, or refusal to grant the full amount requested. Such capital restrictions are 
mentioned in several studies. Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994), for example, analyzed the be-
havior of individuals in the US who unexpectedly received a sum of capital (which 
was an inheritance in their study). They found that the unexpected capital inflow in-
creased the probability of becoming an entrepreneur. This, they conclude, indicates an 
undercapitalization of latent entrepreneurs which prevents them from starting a busi-
ness.  
Evans and Jovanovic (1989) estimate the scale of capital restrictions. They found a 
capital limit of 1.5 times the volume of an entrepreneur’s own funds (hypothesis 2). 
Capital restrictions for small and medium sized firms are also found in the German 
case, with lower limits for younger firms than for older ones (Audretsch and Elston 
1997; Winker 1999). Egeln et al. (1997) state: “a shortage of financial resources con-
stitutes a severe restriction on potential founders and a difficult problem for fledgling 
firms” (Egeln et al. 1997, p. 145). 
Actually, there is no dispute about the existence of capital restrictions and the fact 
that they concern some firms more than others. However, information on how many 
firms are really affected is scarce. Levenson and Willard (2000) estimated this number. 
They found a share of roughly 6 percent of SMEs in the US which are faced with capi-
tal restrictions. 2 percentage points represented creditworthy firms whose loan applica-
tion had been refused. 4 percentage points were actually unreliable firms deterred from 
applying for credit by their own negative appraisal of their prospects (hypothesis 4). 
Levenson und Willard suggest, however, that only creditworthy firms that were refuse 
credit should be counted as being restricted. Thus, the problem of capital restriction for 
SMEs is not as big as first thought. One of their regression results nevertheless indi-
cates a handicap for start-ups: firms in which founders still hold an interest – a condi-
tion which is quite normal for start-ups – are faced with a significantly higher probabil-
ity of a loan application refusal. 
However, bank loans have become a more important source of start-up finance in 
the last few decades, which may be put down to improved monitoring and screening 
methods (Hamilton and Fox 1998). A further cause may be the improved ability of 
founders to provide collateral (Cowling and Westhead 1996). Hulburt and Scherr 
(2003) find that young US firms use secured loans more often than incumbent firms 
do. This might be supply-side induced, since banks are prone to rely on secured short-
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term loans at the lower end of their lending margin, where defaults are more likely 
(Cowling and Westhead 1996). Considering the findings of Tamari (1980), this condi-
tion might actually restrict the supply of capital for young firms. His analysis of sev-
eral studies shows that young firms actually have less demand for short-term bank 
debt; they rather need long-term loans (Scherr and Hulburt 2001). Firms can bridge 
short periods by means of alternative instruments like supplier credits. Indeed, supplier 
credits are of great importance for start-ups (Peterson and Shulman 1987). In general, 
the supply of bank credit seems not to be the chief problem for SMEs, as the analysis 
of Binks and Ennew (1997) suggests. They show that bank fees, interest rates and col-
lateral are the real causes of conflict between firms and their banks. 
From the studies mentioned above, we can see that many investigations concern 
general aspects of SME financing without considering the characteristics of the firms. 
But such characteristics may be important, as shown by Cressy (1996). With regard to 
the capital restrictions of SMEs he does not agree with Evans and Jovanovic (1989) 
that firms’ own funds determine the available finance. He rather suggests that the en-
trepreneur’s human capital is essential for accessing financial means. Based on his 
analysis with enterprise data from UK he states: “firms self-selected for funds on the 
basis of their proprietor's human capital with better businesses more likely to borrow” 
(Cressy 1996, p. 1266). This actually means that entrepreneurs with high human capi-
tal are able to help themselves to get adequate finance (hypothesis 1). Human capital 
can be built up by formal education, on-the-job training or professional experience 
(Becker 1985; Mincer 1974). Entrepreneurial experience is thus part of human capital 
and should enable entrepreneurs to make superior decisions. Due to the importance of 
an entrepreneur’s human capital provision she or he is either a key capability or a con-
straint on re-source acquisition (Brown and Kirchhoff 1997). 
Advantages for experienced entrepreneurs in the acquisition of financial means are 
also seen by Åstebro and Bernhardt (2003) – even if they observed the opposite of 
what Cressy (1996) recorded. They found a reduced utilization of bank loans by entre-
preneurs with higher human capital. In contrast to Cressy, who does not want to specu-
late if this observation is supply or demand-side driven, they suggest the latter. It 
would be unrealistic to presume that banks are more likely to deny access to capital in 
the case of individuals with a higher human capital endowment. On the other hand, this 
is where the criticism made by Hughes (1997) comes in. He criticizes banks for focus-
ing too much on the firm’s current state, rather than on characteristics of the entrepre-
neurs and on growth perspectives when they assess credit approval. This is also sug-
gested by Cassar (2004). He did not find any relation between entrepreneurial human 
capital and finance structure. Education and professional training neither affect the 
debt ratio of start-ups nor the utilization of different financing alternatives like external 
financing, long-term debt or bank loans. 
Experienced entrepreneurs are more likely to have network contacts than novice en-
trepreneurs, who still need to establish them. “Networking allows entrepreneurs to 
enlarge their knowledge of opportunities, to gain access to critical resources, and to 
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deal with business obstacles” (Ucbasaran et al. 2001, p.62). This is a further reason 
why experienced entrepreneurs should differ in the sources of financing they use. Nev-
ertheless, the positive network effect can turn negative since networks allow informa-
tion to spread rapidly, be it good or bad. Circulation of bad information, for example 
after a business failure, might thus impede capital acquisition. However, even without 
this effect, previously failed entrepreneurs are more likely to have problems raising 
funds. Business failure may result in the loss of all commercial and private financial 
means or collaterals, reducing financial leeway of entrepreneurs very directly. But fail-
ure might also cause indirect restrictions, for example creditors are more wary of lend-
ing because they are more sensitive to risk or because new debts would be subordi-
nated to existing obligations from previous commitments. A number of subjective rea-
sons also accompany these objective reasons and account for possible problems. Failed 
entrepreneurs can often fall victim to their self-esteem, fostering doubts about their 
own abilities. This might force them into migrating toward bootstrap financing meth-
ods, avoiding traditional funding sources (Carter and Van Auken 2005) (hypothesis 4, 
addition).2 
The literature survey shows that only a small number of authors who consider SME 
financing include the aspect of entrepreneurial experience. This analysis therefore aims 
at a widely neglected issue in firm financing. On the basis of the above summarized 
empirical work, it is possible to derive five hypotheses for testing in the analytical part 
of the article: 
Hypothesis 1: Start-ups established by previously successful entrepreneurs are less 
likely to be faced with financing problems than other start-ups. 
Hypothesis 2: Start-ups established by previously failed entrepreneurs are more 
likely to be faced with financing problems than other start-ups. 
Hypothesis 3: Start-ups established by previously failed entrepreneurs are less of-
ten based on the founder’s own funds than other start-ups. 
Hypothesis 4: Start-ups established by previously failed entrepreneurs are less of-
ten based on bank loans than other start-ups. 
Hypothesis 5: Start-ups established by previously failed entrepreneurs are more of-
ten based on informal capital from family and friends, than other start-ups. 
Applied data 
The analysis is based on data from the KfW Start-up Monitor. The KfW Start-up 
Monitor is a representative annual survey of the German population over 14 years of 
age. The relevant survey was conducted from August to November 2003, collecting 
information on 40,155 individuals. 1,125 individuals answered in the affirmative when 
asked if they had become self-employed during the last twelve months, regardless of 
whether it be on a regular or “sideline” basis. These individuals are the starting sample 
for the analysis. 
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Table 1 displays some characteristics of the individuals, separated into novice and 
experienced entrepreneurs. Differences between them are only described in detail in 
the following if a test on mean differences rejects equality. Roughly a quarter of the 
individuals have entrepreneurial experience. Entrepreneurial experience means that 
they are either portfolio entrepreneurs, i.e. still participating in their previous firm, or 
are restarters, i.e. they abandoned a previous business. The composition of the group is 
as follows: 18 percent of the experienced entrepreneurs are portfolio entrepreneurs, a 
further 24 percent are restarters who sold or transferred their business, 50 percent are 
restarters who closed or liquidated their firms, and lastly, 8 percent are restarters who 
went bankrupt. The latter thus account for a relatively small share of 1.5 percent of all 
entrepreneurs. 23 percent of the entrepreneurs have multiple entrepreneurial experi-
ences, i.e. have established more than once previously.  
65 percent of the experienced entrepreneurs are male which is an 8 percentage point 
higher share than in the group of novice entrepreneurs. 91 percent of all entrepreneurs 
are German. Half of the novice entrepreneurs are younger than 37 years of age. Thus, 
this cohort is younger than the experienced cohort, where half of the entrepreneurs are 
42 years or older. 30 percent of the experienced entrepreneurs and a quarter of the nov-
ice entrepreneurs are graduates, i.e. have an academic degree and hence have com-
pleted a course of university education. 18 percent of the experienced entrepreneurs are 
involved in their venture in an entrepreneurial team, as are 24 percent of the novice 
entrepreneurs. This indicates that novice entrepreneurs and experienced entrepreneurs 
weigh up the pro and cons3 of entrepreneurial teams differently. 
The start-up size does not differ significantly between the groups of novice and ex-
perienced entrepreneurs. Both have an average of 2 employees (1.3 in full-time and 0.8 
in part-time). Real firm foundations, i.e. setting up combinations of production factors 
for the first time – which is different from a derivative start-up, are implemented by 79 
percent of the experienced entrepreneurs. In contrast, novice entrepreneurs only do so 
in 70 percent of cases. Another alternative comes in the form of take-overs, which ac-
count for 9 percent of all start-up cases. The quota of shareholdings acquisitions, i.e. 
firm participation via a purchase of shares, differs significantly again. This start-up 
option is used by 22 percent of the novice entrepreneurs and by 13 percent of the ex-
perienced entrepreneurs. 
Entering entrepreneurship through a sideline start-up is an often-used opportunity. 
Only 37 percent of the novice entrepreneurs and 53 percent of the experienced entre-
preneurs regard a new venture as regular employment. 56 percent of the entrepreneurs 
venture in liberal professions. A third of the experienced entrepreneurs have been un-
employed prior to the start-up, while the figure for novice entrepreneurs is slightly 
lower, at 28 percent. 
Roughly three quarters of the start-up entrepreneurs have a need for financial 
means. Thus, a quarter of them stated that they did not require financial means for im-
plementing the start-up. Since the question aimed directly at the capital which was 
necessary to realize the venture, regardless of whether it be own or outside capital, this 
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result seems strange at the first glance. However, a possible explanation is that it indi-
cates that these entrepreneurs must have had access to free infrastructure and resources 
when they ventured. This is the case if they, for example, made investments in kind or 
at least had the right to use facilities or resources. The latter situation is most conceiv-
able in the case of sideline start-ups, as the founders often have the opportunity to run 
their business from at home. Indeed, 80 percent of the entrepreneurs with no financing 
demand are sideline entrepreneurs, which supports this thesis. Nevertheless, the aver-
age financing demand is 23,000 Euro. However, this figure is forced up by some big 
budget cases, as the median of only 6,000 Euro shows. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Many of the entrepreneurs had problems satisfying their demand for financing. 21 
percent of the novice entrepreneurs and 28 percent of the experienced entrepreneurs 
were faced with such difficulties. There are three main sources which entrepreneurs 
tapped to meet their financing demand: their own funds, bank loans, and money from 
family and friends. Own funds are the most important for entrepreneurs, since they 
come into play for 85 percent of the novice entrepreneurs and 78 percent of the experi-
Characteristics Altogether Novice entrepreneurs 
Experienced 
entrepreneurs 
Confidence 
level b 
Portfolio-start-up 3,5 - 18,4   
Restart after sale/transfer 4,6 - 23,7   
Restart after closure/liquidation 9,7 - 50,2   
Restart after bankruptcy 1,5 - 7,7   
Multiple entrepreneurial experiences 4,5 - 23,2   
Gender (male) 59,1 57,1 64,9  ** 
Nationality (German) 90,8 91,0 90,5   
Age of the entrepreneur (median) 39,2 (38) 38,0 (37) 44,2 (42) *** 
Graduate 25,8 24,9 29,9  * 
Team start-up 22,3 23,7 17,5  ** 
Start-up size   
 Number of  full time employees (median) 1,3 (0) 1,4 (0) 0,8 (0)  
 Number of  part time employees (median) 0,8 (0) 0,8 (0) 0,8 (0)  
Start-up type     
 Real start-up 71,3  69,3  78,6  *** 
 Take-over 9,0  9,0  8,2   
 Acquisition of shareholdings 19,7  21,7  13,3  *** 
Start-up for regular employment 40,8  37,3  53,4  *** 
Start-up in liberal profession 55,9  55,8  57,1   
Start-up out of unemployment 28,8  27,9  33,7  ** 
Financing     
 Financing demand existed 74,0  73,1  77,8   
 Extent of financing demand (Median) 22656,3 (6000) 22878,7 (6000) 19950,8 (5500)  
 Financing problems occurred 21,8 20,5  27,9  *** 
Financing sources (multiple statements possible)   
 Own funds 83,6 84,8 78,2  * 
 Bank loans 22,2 21,2 25,7   
 Funding from family and friends 20,7 17,9 31,7  *** 
a  Missing values are not imputed. The number of observations might differ thus from those shown in Table 2, Table 3, or Table 4. 
b Significance of F-tests on the equality of means between novice entrepreneurs and experienced entrepreneurs. 
Confidence levels: p < 0.01 = “***”, p < 0.05 = “**” and p < 0.1 = “*”. 
Quelle: KfW Start-up Monitor. 
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enced entrepreneurs. 22 percent of the entrepreneurs use additionally financial means 
from banks. Family and friends also often contribute to start-ups. 18 percent of the 
novice entrepreneurs and almost a third of the experienced entrepreneurs utilize this 
source of capital. 
Testing the hypotheses 
Definitions and indicators 
The analysis in this article is focused on the effects of entrepreneurial experience on 
start-up financing, with five aspects being considered in detail. The first item is 
whether or not a demand for financing existed. Financing demand in this case is taken 
to comprise both own funds and outside finance. Secondly, it is of interest to what ex-
tent entrepreneurs needed financing and if they had problems meeting that need, which 
is the third item. Lastly, the composition of the financing sources tapped is worthy of 
attention. The answers to two central questions can provide further information on this 
point: items four and five are therefore how likely and to what extent particular sources 
are used. It is important to distinguish between those two approaches. For example, it 
is possible that banks may not select with regard to the relative frequency of transac-
tions they make with different type of entrepreneurs, but may be prone to finance a 
higher share of a business’ capital if the entrepreneur was previously successful. 
As mentioned, not only entrepreneurial experience itself is considered when analyz-
ing the effects on start-up financing but also different kinds of this experience. This is 
because previous success results in a different type of learning than previous failure, as 
the outcome of previous events determines the mode in which experience is trans-
formed into knowledge (Politis 2005). While it is more likely that success stabilizes 
routines, failure may disrupt them, triggering modes of higher-order learning (Cope 
2005). In order to distinguish between success and failure it is necessary to define both 
of them. As the reasons for firm closure can be many and diverse and information 
about the true reasons is not available, one has to rely on obvious facts for classifica-
tion. Such an obvious characteristic is the situation in which the previous business is, 
i.e. does it still exist or how was it closed. There are four situations which can be iden-
tified in the data. In the first, the business still exists and the entrepreneur still partici-
pates in it. In the second situation, the business still exists but the entrepreneur sold or 
transferred it. The third possibility is that the firm has been liquidated or closed by the 
entrepreneur. The final situation is that of the entrepreneur having gone bankrupt with 
the business. This classification is suitable to approximately distinguish between suc-
cess and failure. If either of the first two situations applies, we can assume positive 
experience. The third situation is ambiguous and could be connected either with suc-
cess or with failure. However, bankruptcy is a characteristic which is very closely re-
lated to business failure and is thus an appropriate failure indicator. 
The KfW Start-up Monitor applies a very wide definition of what is regarded as a 
start-up. The definition is independent from any register entries and relies on the self-
assessment of the persons questioned. Due to the inclusion of sideline entrepreneurs 
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and entrepreneurs affiliated to liberal professions, the definition actually more or less 
takes “self-employment” and “start-up” to be similar, which is not necessarily the case. 
Actually, one might understand self-employed persons as being more closely related to 
individuals who earning their own living than entrepreneurs. But this is a matter of 
opinion. 
Beside the indicators accounting for entrepreneurial experience the data contains a 
large amount of additional information. There are firm-related measures standing for 
industry (NACE 2-digit-level), start-up type (real start-up, take-over, and sharehold-
ings acquisition), or firm-size (number of employees in full- and part-time) as well as 
information related to the entrepreneur like age, gender, education (graduate), or em-
ployment status prior to the start-up. 
The question which opens the finance topic in the survey concerns the extent of fi-
nancing demand for the start-up. The question can be applied to select entrepreneurs of 
interest, since only entrepreneurs who had a demand for financing were asked for fur-
ther information on their finances. Through this selection the data is biased, which 
must be taken account of in the analyses. The selection can be modeled as follows: 
1111 uxy += β  and 
[ ]01 222 >+= vxy δ , 
where information on finance matters (y1) is only observable if there was financing 
demand (y2 = 1).4  
Regressing y1 on x1 without taking the selection into account would result in incon-
sistent estimators. Contrarily, regressing yi1 on xi1, λ(xiδ2) would enable consistent es-
timators (Heckman 1979), but, unfortunately, δ2 is unknown. Using regression results 
from the selection equation, however, makes it possible to obtain 2δ
)
 which is an esti-
mation for δ2. On the basis of this estimated value it is possible to compute the inverse 
Mills Ratio ( ) ( ) ( )2222 / δδφδλλ )))) iiii xxx Φ≡≡  which is a correction term. After all, re-
gressing yi1 on xi1, 2iλ)  results in consistent estimators. 
The type of regression apart from the selection equation differs depending on the 
type of question to be answered. The extent of financing demand is given as a continu-
ous variable and is thus to be estimated using an ordinary-least-squares regression 
(OLS). Contrarily, the information about the occurrence of problems covering the fi-
nancing demand is recorded discretely, more precisely in a dichotomous manner. It is 
therefore to be estimated with a probit model. With regard to the utilization of the fi-
nancing sources it has to be taken into account that the decision about whether to util-
ize a particular source or not, and to what extent to use it, depends on all the alternative 
options. The decision process therefore contains multiple decisions which are decided 
simultaneously rather than sequentially. The decision, for example, to request means 
from a financial source which is lower down in the pecking order depends on whether 
the full financing demand can be covered by using preferred sources. A similar logic 
applies to the extent of utilization. Such interdependencies have to be taken into ac-
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count when analyzing the data. This can be done by applying a seemingly-unrelated-
regressions model (SUR) (Zellner 1962). A SUR model is a system of simultaneously 
estimated regression equations 
1111 uxy += β  
2222 uxy += β  
…
 
GGGG uxy += β . 
Each regression equation in the system has its own coefficient vector βg, so the 
equations seem to be unrelated to each other. But the relation is given because the free-
dom of the model allows correlations among the residuals. That is, the unconditioned 
variance matrix Ω ≡ E(uiui´) is entirely unrestricted. A SUR-model is originally a sys-
tem of OLS regressions. That is, if the endogenous variables are not continuous but 
rather dichotomous the model has to be adjusted. Then, a multivariate probit-model5 is 
applicable, which is a system of probit regressions allowing similarly correlations 
among the residuals. The multivariate probit model is applied to analyze the probabil-
ity of utilizing particular financing sources while the SUR-model is applied to analyze 
the extent in which these sources are tapped. 
Estimation results 
The results from the estimation of the selection equation are displayed in the first 
columns of Table 2. Four measures have a significant effect on the probability of hav-
ing financing demand. Start-up entrepreneurs who sold or transferred their previous 
business, men, and start-ups in regular employment are more likely to have financing 
demand than other entrepreneurs. Contrarily, financing demand is less likely if start-up 
is implemented through financial participation than by real start-up or take-over. 
In the middle columns of Table 2 the results on the extent of financing demand are 
displayed. In order to attain direct impacts of the indicators’ effects on the financing 
demand the demand is introduced in logs into the regression. Then the estimated coef-
ficients can be interpreted as rates of change. Of all the experience measures, only the 
business failure indicator shows a significant effect. Compared to the financing de-
mand of the reference group of entrepreneurs – founders without entrepreneurial ex-
perience or academic education whose venture is a real start-up – the demand de-
creases by 80 percent in case of previously bankrupt restarters. 
The financing demand of graduate start-up entrepreneurs is 29 percent higher than 
that of reference entrepreneurs. Besides, the start-up size is important. Every additional 
worker employed at the time of foundation increases the financing demand by roughly 
6 to 7 percent. Take-overs are the most capital intensive. The financing demand rises 
by 84 percent in case of take-overs compared to real start-ups. Contrarily, financing 
demand decreases by 37 percent if entrepreneurs venture in a liberal profession. 
As already mentioned, the issue of business financing is a problem for many entre-
preneurs. But the risk of being confronted with financing problems actually depends on 
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the single entrepreneurs and their characteristics, as the next analysis will show. There 
are fours factors that affect the risk significantly. These are displayed in the last col-
umns of Table 2. There is the extent of financing demand, the existence of failure ex-
perience, the age of the entrepreneurs, and their working status prior to the start-up. 
Following these findings, hypothesis 1 must be rejected. Previous entrepreneurial suc-
cess does not reduce the occurrence of financing problems. Contrarily, hypothesis 2 is 
not rejected. Entrepreneurs with failure experience are more likely to be faced with 
financing problems than other entrepreneurs. Their risk is 37 percent higher.6 Further-
more, financing problems occur more often in cases when the financing demand ex-
ceeding 10,000 Euro. Young entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs who were unemployed 
prior to start-up are faced with above average risk, too. 
Table 2: Regressions on start-up financing 
Probit OLS-regression Probit 
Determinants Financing demand
exists 
Extent of the 
financing demand 
log(Euro) 
Financing problems 
occurred 
Extent of financing demand (ref.: less than 3,000 Euro)       
 more than 3,000 Euro to 10,000 Euro and less - - - - 0.175 (0.153) 
 more than 10,000 Euro to 40,000 Euro and less - - - - 0.380** (0.175) 
 more than 40,000 Euro to 80,000 Euro and less - - - - 0.796*** (0.239) 
 more than 80,000 Euro - - - - 0.772*** (0.235) 
Portfolio-start-up 0.392 (0.301) -0.468 (0.312) 0.282 (0.319) 
Restart after sale/transfer 0.591** (0.295) -0.227 (0.287) 0.037 (0.295) 
Restart after closure/liquidation -0.145 (0.175) -0.076 (0.208) 0.279 (0.212) 
Restart after bankruptcy 0.971 (0.598) -0.824* (0.441) 1.128*** (0.424) 
Multiple entrepreneurial experiences -0.413 (0.256) 0.382 (0.311) -0.120 (0.320) 
Gender (male) 0.268** (0.104) - - 0.117 (0.150) 
Nationality (German) 0.085 (0.193) -0.088 (0.215) -0.167 (0.207) 
Age of the entrepreneur -0.002 (0.004) - - -0.011** (0.005) 
Graduate 0.159 (0.115) 0.263* (0.136) -0.007 (0.143) 
Team start-up 0.174 (0.130) - - 0.002 (0.151) 
Start-up size       
 Number of  full time employees (median) 0.000 (0.007) 0.058*** (0.016) - - 
 Number of  part time employees (median) 0.011 (0.024) 0.066** (0.025) - - 
Start-up type (ref.: real start-up)       
 Take-over -0.090 (0.204) 0.836*** (0.221) - - 
 Acquisition of shareholdings -0.410*** (0.137) -0.141 (0.210) - - 
Start-up for regular employment 0.480*** (0.117) - - 0.214 (0.184) 
Start-up in liberal profession -0.052 (0.101) -0.367*** (0.124) -0.081 (0.126) 
Start-up out of unemployment -0.022 (0.119) - - 0.481*** (0.130) 
Inverse Mills Ratio - - -2.504*** (0.499) 0.532 (0.641) 
Constant 0.427 (0.298) 10.405*** (0.333) -0.928* (0.507) 
Joint significance of the         
 Industry indicators b 4.73  3.76***  8.63  
 Regional indicators b 3.90  0.20  4.62  
 Missing value indicators c 44.57***  2.02*  1.10  
Number of observations 908  613  666  
LR-Test χ2 (F-Test) 131.99***  (5.94***)  71.77***  
(Pseudo-)R2 (0.127)  0.179   (0.102)  
a Confidence levels: p < 0.01 = “***”, p < 0.05 = “**” and p < 0.1 = “*”. Standard errors in parentheses. 
b Not separately reported.  
c Not separately reported. For each variable showing missing values a separate dummy variable is introduced accounting for these 
missing values while recoding the missing values (Cohen and Cohen 1983). 
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The analysis for which the results are displayed in Table 3 focuses on the probabil-
ity of utilizing particular financing sources. Beside the three main financing sources, 
namely own funds, bank loans, and money from family and friends, there is a fourth 
category, which is the aggregate of the remaining sources like equity or venture capital 
and public support etc.  
Table 3: Multivariate probit-model on the likelihood of utilizing financing sources 
Dependent variable: 
utilization of financing sources Own funds Bank loans 
Means from 
family and friends 
Other 
means 
Extent of financing demand 
(ref.: less than 3,000 Euro) 
            
 3,000 Euro to 10,000 Euro -0.084 (0.201) 0.558*** (0.214) 0.451** (0.183) -0.113 (0.207) 
 10,000 Euro to 40,000 Euro -0.650*** (0.218) 1.111*** (0.231) 0.231 (0.222) 0.432* (0.224) 
 40,000 Euro to 80,000 Euro -0.189 (0.296) 1.210*** (0.284) 0.244 (0.286) 0.740*** (0.281) 
 more than 80,000 Euro -0.822*** (0.280) 2.063*** (0.296) 0.428 (0.291) 1.159*** (0.289) 
Portfolio-start-up -0.473 (0.342) 0.163 (0.383) 1.160*** (0.325) -4.150 (71.593)
Restart after sale/transfer -0.167 (0.320) 0.546* (0.303) 0.261 (0.325) -0.509 (0.325) 
Restart after closure/liquidation 0.083 (0.288) -0.387 (0.303) 0.390* (0.235) -0.873*** (0.317) 
Restart after bankruptcy 0.096 (0.685) 0.431 (0.603) 0.655 (0.576) 0.057 (0.583) 
Multiple entrepreneurial experiences 0.115 (0.399) 0.210 (0.411) 0.146 (0.378) 0.565 (0.435) 
Nationality (German) 0.597** (0.232) -0.309 (0.239) -0.781*** (0.221) 0.264 (0.271) 
Age of the entrepreneur 0.007 (0.007) -0.010 (0.007) -0.024*** (0.007) 0.000 (0.007) 
Graduate 0.130 (0.173) -0.372** (0.181) 0.178 (0.160) -0.048 (0.177) 
Start-up for regular employment 0.302 (0.214) 0.016 (0.212) 0.065 (0.202) 0.541** (0.218) 
Start-up in liberal profession 0.112 (0.157) -0.040 (0.158) -0.079 (0.153) -0.071 (0.164) 
Start-up out of unemployment -0.421** (0.171) -0.036 (0.172) 0.523*** (0.164) 0.923*** (0.169) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.133 (0.599) -0.143 (0.637) 0.734 (0.528) 0.018 (0.653) 
Constant 0.487 (0.502) -0.635 (0.513) -0.138 (0.466) -1.875*** (0.544)
Joint significance of the χ2-Test  χ2-Test  χ2-Test  χ2-Test  
 Industry indicators b 10.56*  8.54*  4.09  2.00  
 Regional indicators b 2.17  3.04  3.91  1.22  
 Missing value indicators c 1.94  2.67*  0.52  2.52  
Rho21 Rho31 Rho41 Rho32 Rho42 Rho43 Correlations of the cross equation 
error terms c -0.597*** -0.182** -0.428*** -0.000 0.029  0.105  
Number of observations 487          
Wald-Test χ2 177.04***         
a Confidence levels: p < 0.01 = “***”, p < 0.05 = “**” and p < 0.1 = “*”. Standard errors in parentheses. 
b Not separately reported. 
c Estimated values of the cross equation error terms in the variance-covariance-matrix. 
 
Contrary to expectations there are no significant effects of any entrepreneurial ex-
perience measure on the utilization of own funds. Hypothesis 3 is therefore rejected. 
There are only four measures that show significant effects on the choice of sources of 
funding. The financing demand is important since the probability that an entrepreneur 
will utilizing his or her own funds decreases when the financing demand exceeds 
10,000 Euro. This is not true if the financing demand is between 40,000 Euro and 
80,000 Euro. In this case, there is no significant effect. However, it is not clear why. 
Furthermore, entrepreneurs who are German are significantly more likely to use their 
own funds, while those who were unemployed prior to the start-up are less likely to do 
so. 
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When it comes to the utilization of bank loans as a source of financing, the number 
of indicators showing significant effects is again low. Only one experience indicator 
shows a significant effect. Restarters who have sold or transferred their firms are more 
likely to use bank loans than others. That is, hypothesis 3, which postulated a negative 
expectation about the utilization of bank loans by failed entrepreneurs, is rejected. In 
addition, significantly increased probabilities are found if the financing demand is in 
one of the categories above 3,000 Euro. Contrarily, graduate entrepreneurs are less 
likely to utilize bank loans. This supports the idea that graduates do not need to rely on 
bank loans because they are more autonomous in choosing their financing sources 
(Åstebro and Bernhardt 2003). 
Portfolio entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs who closed or liquidated a firm prior to 
starting a new business are more likely than others to utilize means from family and 
friends. Again, there is no evidence that previously failed entrepreneurs differ from 
others, so hypothesis 5 is rejected. In other words, they are not more likely to use such 
informal capital. Furthermore, family and friends are important if the financing de-
mand is between 3,000 and 10,000 Euro. This is a range which covers amounts large 
enough to have a good chance of being higher than the entrepreneur’s unappropriated 
private savings; at the same time, however, the amounts required are probably not high 
enough to necessitate utilizing formal capital. Foreign entrepreneurs are more likely to 
use means from family and friends than their German counterparts. The same is true of 
entrepreneurs who start a business out of unemployment. But this source of informal 
capital loses importance the older entrepreneurs get. This effect might be the result of 
built-up savings or persistence effects like being loyal to one’s regular bank. 
Beside the three main financing sources there is the aggregate of the remaining 
sources. It is a tripartite aggregate containing equity- or venture capital, means from 
several public start-up support measures, and means from particular start-up aid for the 
unemployed. Again, only one experience measure shows significant effects. Restarters 
who closed or liquidated a firm prior to start-up are less likely to use other means than 
the main sources. Contrarily, there is some indication that other means are important 
when the financing demand exceeds 10,000 Euro. This is true of both start-ups from 
regular employment and start-ups out of unemployment. Splitting up the aggregate was 
not possible due to the low number of cases for the each of the single forms of financ-
ing. Nevertheless, it is possible to conduct bivariate tests between the single measures 
and the indicators showing significant effects on the use of forms of funding that con-
stitute of the aggregate. In this way an indication is obtained as to which source of the 
aggregate could be the reason for the significant effect. Most of the tests hint at a spe-
cial importance of public support for start-ups. That is, all but two of the significant 
effects obtained are attributable to this source. The impacts of both financing demand 
below 80,000 Euro and start-up out of unemployment are unrelated to public support 
for start-ups. However, the latter is strongly related to start-up aid for the unemployed. 
Table 4 displays the estimation results of the SUR-model which is applied to ana-
lyze the extent to which the different financing sources are used. The table does not 
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contain separate columns for the aggregate of other sources, as this was not possible 
for technical reasons. Applying the SUR-model requires the omission of a reference 
source. The findings show that reference start-up entrepreneurs – who are again foun-
ders without entrepreneurial experience and academic education venturing with a real 
start-up – fund their start-up using on average 62 percent own funds, 16 percent bank 
loans, 21 percent means from family and friends and nearly 2 percent of other means.  
Table 4: Seemingly-unrelated-regressions-model on the extent of financing source utili-
zation 
Dependent variable: 
Share of each financing source in percentage points Own funds Bank loans 
Means from 
family and friends 
Extent of financing demand (ref.: less than 3,000 Euro)          
 3,000 Euro to 10,000 Euro -9.034** (4.174) 7.641** (3.070) 4.300 (2.638) 
 10,000 Euro to 40,000 Euro -23.227*** (4.930) 18.324*** (3.626) 1.800 (3.116) 
 40,000 Euro to 80,000 Euro -26.415*** (6.571) 19.636*** (4.833) -1.586 (4.153) 
 more than 80,000 Euro -45.686*** (6.839) 29.400*** (5.030) 0.357 (4.322) 
Portfolio-start-up -24.292*** (8.671) 8.493 (6.378) 28.724*** (5.480) 
Restart after sale/transfer -4.757 (7.661) 9.438* (5.635) 1.381 (4.841) 
Restart after closure/liquidation 7.024 (5.789) -1.999 (4.258) 4.444 (3.659) 
Restart after bankruptcy -17.825 (14.184) 12.803 (10.433) 10.455 (8.964) 
Multiple entrepreneurial experiences -2.238 (9.190) 1.648 (6.759) 0.847 (5.807) 
Nationality (German) 15.467*** (5.797) -5.978 (4.264) -15.590*** (3.664) 
Age of the entrepreneur 0.303** (0.149) -0.200* (0.110) -0.159* (0.094) 
Graduate 3.499 (3.750) -3.983 (2.758) 1.514 (2.370) 
Start-up for regular employment -3.300 (4.645) -0.318 (3.417) -2.924 (2.936) 
Start-up in liberal profession 3.722 (3.524) -0.653 (2.592) -1.108 (2.227) 
Start-up out of unemployment -15.826*** (3.891) -0.535 (2.862) 10.125*** (2.459) 
Inverse Mills Ratio -9.875 (12.824) 3.870 (9.433) 8.188 (8.104) 
Constant 61.738*** (11.318) 15.936* (8.325) 20.561*** (7.152) 
Joint significance of the          
 Industry indicators b 9.32*  7.17  3.56  
 Regional indicators b 5.24  2.97  4.72  
 Missing value indicators c 0.11  1.39  0.40  
Number of observations 487  487  487  
χ2-Test 141.72***  88.89***  92.72***  
a Confidence levels: p < 0.01 = “***”, p < 0.05 = “**” and p < 0.1 = “*”. Standard errors in parentheses. 
b Not separately reported. 
c The correlations between the error terms of the OLS-regressions are Rho21 = -0.525, Rho31 = -0.461 and Rho32 = -0.155. A 
Breusch-Pagan-Test χ2 = 249.34 rejects the hypothesis the correlations are jointly zero. 
 
As seen with regard to the probability analysis, the extent analysis, too, shows that 
experience only has limited effects. Portfolio-entrepreneurs are not less likely to utilize 
their own funds, but the share of their own funds they utilized to start a business was 
24 percentage points lower than that of other entrepreneurs. Conversely, they use 29 
percentage points more means from family and friends. Furthermore, the share of bank 
loans used is increased by 9 percentage points in the case of restarters who closed or 
liquidated a business prior to start-up. 
There are several other effects regarding the utilization of financing sources. The 
extent of financing demand is important. The higher it is the lower the share of own 
funds but the higher the share of bank loans. Compared to foreign entrepreneurs, Ger-
mans use less of their own funds and less means from family and friends. The age of 
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entrepreneurs is relevant as the share of own funds increases the older they get. Con-
versely, age has a negative effect on both the share of bank loans as well as the share 
of means from family and friends. Lastly, if the start-up took place out of unemploy-
ment, the share of own funds is decreased but there is an increased share of means 
from family and friends.  
Discussion of the findings 
Surveys show that the issue of financing is central in the mind of start-up entrepre-
neurs. Theoretically, effects arising from learning and networking suggest that experi-
enced entrepreneurs should be less worried about start-up financing than other entre-
preneurs.7 On the other hand, experience of failure might have negative effects. The 
analysis herein is focused on the effects of entrepreneurial experience on several as-
pects of start-up financing, in order to shed light on this question. The main points ana-
lyzed were the impact of experience on the occurrence of financing problems and the 
utilization of particular financing sources. 
The findings suggest that entrepreneurial experience is important with regard to 
start-up financing issues. Yet the effects depend on the kind of experience, i.e. on the 
way the entrepreneurial experience was gained. Referred to the extent of the demand 
for financing, there is only an indication of reduced demand in the case of restarters 
venturing after a business failure, i.e. bankruptcy. This might be caused by different 
factors. There might be an endogenous effect arising from behavior adjustments like 
the reduction of risk orientation (McCarthy 2000; Wiseman and Bromiley 1996) which 
would result in a rejection of responsibilities for high budgets. But external restrictions, 
too, might cause a decreased financing demand. If, for example, real financing demand 
exceeds the credit limit it has to be downsized. This result partly confirms the findings 
of Kay et al. (2004) who showed that the start-up capital of restarters is significantly 
lower than that of novice and portfolio entrepreneurs. 
Another constituent of human capital, alongside experience, is education. It, too, 
has effects on financing issues. Graduate entrepreneurs have a higher demand for fi-
nancing. This might be due to better knowledge about new technologies compared to 
other entrepreneurs. Knowing about such technologies might result in a desire to own 
them, which would push up financing demand. 
Experience has some effect on the probability of utilizing different financing 
sources and the extent to which each is used. Portfolio-entrepreneurs are more likely to 
use means from family and friends and do so for a greater share of their financing 
needs. Moreover, they use own funds as often as other entrepreneurs but do so to a 
smaller share. This suggests that the capital lockup in the existing firm opens a funding 
gap, a large part of which is then closed by informal capital, although the entrepreneurs 
retain a certain minimum ownership share. Restarters who sold or transferred a previ-
ous business are more likely to use bank loans and they also use them for a higher 
share of their total financing needs. This indicates that banks are less worried about 
putting capital at their disposal than would be the case for other entrepreneurs. Re-
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starters who closed/liquidated a previous business utilize means from family and 
friends more often than most other entrepreneurs, yet they do not differ in the share 
used. This suggests that, similarly to portfolio-entrepreneurs, they must rely more often 
on informal capital but that they cannot get more money from private lenders than oth-
ers. 
Restarters with failure experience do not differ in their utilization of financing 
sources, either in terms of probability or extent. Nevertheless, they are more likely to 
be faced with financing difficulties, which is also indicated by the findings of Kay et 
al. (2004).It seems thus that failure experience puts pressure on the entrepreneurs con-
cerned, who then have to make more effort to raise capital. But if they get over the 
hurdle they show a similar financing pattern to other entrepreneurs. 
Policy implications 
In Germany one often hears of “stigmatization” when the subject of failed entrepre-
neurs is debated (e.g. Vierbuchen 2005). It is said that in Germany failed entrepreneurs 
would be branded because of their business failure, with the result that it is difficult for 
them to find their feet again, economically and socially (Koark 2005). On the basis of 
such beliefs there are calls for “a culture of the second chance” or for “an end to stig-
matization”.8 There have even been calls for support measures specifically for failed 
entrepreneurs (Europäische Kommission 2002). With the reservation that individual 
cases exist where stigmatization has indeed taken place, there is no indication that the 
situation in Germany is any worse. Indeed, although failed entrepreneurs are more 
likely to have financing difficulties, there are other reasons behind this than stigmatiza-
tion. For example, an individual’s credit rating might be poor because of old debts. 
Additionally, “lenders would be loath to lend to once-failed business owners who want 
to start new businesses, because owners have little incentive to work hard if additional 
earnings mainly benefit their old creditors” (Fan and White 2003, p. 564). Besides, 
stigmatization as indicated by obstacles like “personal rejection in one’s milieu” or 
“rejection through business partners” are not mentioned more often by failed entrepre-
neurs than by others (Kay et al. 2007). However, the fear of failure is above average in 
Germany compared to other countries (e.g. Sternberg et al. 2006), thus it is often used 
as proof for this hypothesis as well. But this above-average fear of failure is more a 
matter of risk awareness than of stigmatization. This is indicated by survey results: 
when asked for reasons for abandoning a start-up project, would-be entrepreneurs 
mention extensive financial risk more often than fear of dropping in social status 
(Engel et al. 2004 or Lehnert and Reents 2004).9  
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Notes 
1  Source: KfW Start-up Monitor, own evaluation. 
2  Bootstrap financing methods are basically all resource-protecting measures. They can be classified 
into four groups: delaying payments (e.g. payment to suppliers, tax payments, or leasing), minimizing 
accounts receivable (e.g. by factoring), minimizing investments (e.g. buying used equipment or hiring 
temporaries), private-owner financing (e.g. employing relatives at low wages, running the business from 
home or using private credit cards), and sharing resources with other businesses (e.g. employees, equip-
ment, or office space) (Carter and Van Auken 2005). 
3  Lechler and Gemünden 2003 summarize the pros and cons of entrepreneurial teams. Teams have 
socio-psychological and capacitive advantages as well as capability and knowledge advantages. On the 
other hand, they are faced to a higher extent with the risk of ineffective communication, complex and 
time-intensive decision processes, or dysfunctions like group losses (loss of motivation by free riding, 
laziness, or valuation angst, loss of coordination, or loss of the own opinion), bullying, or risk shifts. 
4  Assumptions: (a) (x, y2) are always observed; (b) (u1, v2) is independent of x with zero mean; (c) v2 ~ 
Normal(0,1); and (d) E(u1|v2) = γ1v2 (Wooldridge 2002). 
5  The applied multivariate Probit-Model is estimated with „mvprobit“ using the software package 
STATA. The command is based on Cappellari and Jenkins 2003. 
6  The marginal effect of failure experience is 0,3743. This means that the risk of financing problems 
increases by 37 percent compared to novice entrepreneurs in case of bankruptcy prior to the restart. 
7  One can argue that learning and networking effects depend on the length of time which has passed 
since abandoning a firm. This is true – but not relevant in practice. Separate estimations introducing the 
experience indicators interacted with the time passed reveal only significant results with regard to the 
financing problems analysis. It shows that the negative basic effect of failure experience remains but 
decreases as more time passes since abandoning the firm. 
8  The German Minister of Justice, Brigitte Zypries, spoke at an event organized by the Industrie- und 
Handelskammer Berlin and by the Bund der Selbstständigen: the stigma of failure is a serious problem. 
In order to overcome it we need a culture of the second chance (Zypries 2006). 
9  Indeed, one has to take into consideration the fact that the fear of dropping in social status is not a 
perfect indicator for the fear of failure. 
